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Abst ract - -The  purpose of this paper is to establish general existence of equilibria for noncompact 
generalized games (respectively, noncompact abstract economics) under general setting of noncom- 
pact conditions and in which the L-majorized preference mappings may not have lower semicontinuity, 
and constraint correspondences are only lower or upper semicontinuous. In our model, strategic (re- 
spectively, commodity) spaces are not compact, the set of players (respectively, agents) are countable 
or uncountable, and underlying spaces are either finite- or infinite-dimensional locally topological 
vector spaces. Our results might be regarded as a unified theory for the corresponding results in 
the existing literatures in the study of generalized games (respectively, abstract economics) theory, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to establish the existence of equilibria for noncompact generalized games 
(respectively, noncompact abstract economy) under general setting of noncompact conditions 
and in which strategic (respectively, commodity) spaces are noncompact onvex sets in locally 
topological vector spaces. By using so-called approximate chnique due to Yuan [1], Yuan and 
Tan [2], Tulcea [3,4], and Chang [5], we establish general existence results of equilibria for the 
noncompact model below in which preference correspondences may not have lower semicontinu- 
ity and constraint correspondences are only lower or upper semicontinuous; in particular, the 
underlying setting of noncompact generalized games is general enough to cover corresponding 
noncompact generalized game models in the existing literatures as special cases. In order to ex- 
hibit clearly the idea and method we used in this paper, we only deal with so-called L-majorized 
mappings whose roots go back to Gale and Mas-Colell's pioneering work (e.g., see [6]) which 
has been carried forward by Sharer and Sonnenschein [7] and further developed by Borglin and 
Keiding [8]. 
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A generalized game (respectively, abstract economy) is a family of quadruples F = (Xi; 
Ai, Bi; Pi)ieI where I is a (possible uncountable) set of players (respectively, agents) such that 
for each i C I, Xi is a nonempty strategic (respectively, commodity) subset of a topological 
vector space and Ai, Bi : X = Hj~Xj  ~ 2 X' are constraint correspondences and Pi : X ~ 2 x~ 
is a preference correspondence. When I = {1 , . . . ,N} ,  where N is a positive integer, F = 
(X~; Ai, B~; Pi)i~I is also called an N-person game. An equilibrium of F is a point ~ E X such 
that for each i C I, 2i = 7ri(2) E Bi(:f:) and A~(2) N Pi(5:) = O. 
Since the existence of equilibria in an abstract economy with compact strategy sets in R n was 
proved in a seminal paper of Debreu [9] (see also [10] for more details) which is classical Arrow- 
Debreu-McKenzie model of exchange conomies under the perfect information competition, there 
have been many generalizations of Debreu's theorem. As a result, a number of existence theo- 
rems of equilibria for generalized games (respectively, abstract economics) have been established. 
However, we note that ahnost all of those results so far established in the literature need assump- 
tions such as either preference mappings and/or constraint mappings are lower and/or upper 
semicontinuous, and the set of players (respectively, agents) are finite, or only countably infinite 
and strategic (respectively, commodity) spaces also require to be compact (or even noncompact, 
but the underlying setting of noncompact conditions are much stronger than the one we study 
in this paper). 
Motivated by those shortages of results in the existing literatures for the study of generalized 
games and the question explained above, it is our aim in this paper to investigate the existence 
of equilibria for noncompact generalized games (respectively, noncompact abstract economics) 
and to solve above question involving L-majorized mappings which have been extensively used in 
the existing literatures, e.g., see [2,3,8,11-16]. In our models, strategic (respectively, commodity) 
spaces may not be compact, we allow that the set of players (respectively, agents) may be infinite 
and even uncountable and underlying spaces are infinite dimensional locally topological vector 
spaces. Our results might be regarded as a unified theory for corresponding results in the study 
of existence of equilibria for noncompact generalized games (respectively, abstract economies) in 
the literatures under very general noncompact setting. 
Let X be a topological space and Y a nonempty subset of a vector space, and ¢ : X --* 2 E a 
set-valued mapping. Then 
(1) ¢ is said to be of class L if for each x E X, co¢(x) C Y, x ~ co¢(x), and the set 
¢-1(y) := {x E X : y E ¢(x)} is compactly open in X for each y E Y; 
(2) a mapping Cx : X --~ 2 Y is said to be an Lx-majorant of ¢ at x E X if there exists an 
open neighborhood Nx of x such that 
(a) for each z E Nx, ¢(z) C Cx(z), and z ¢ coCx(z); 
(b) for each z C X, coCx(z) C Y; and 
(c) for each y E Y, the set ¢~-1(y) is compactly open in X; and 
(3) ¢ is said to be L-majorized if for each x E X with ¢(x) ~ 0, there exists Cx-majorant of 
CatxCX.  
By the definition, it is clear that each class of L mapping is L-majorized, but the converse is not 
true in general. 
Let X = IIiEiXi be a product of nonempty convex sets Xi in a Hausdorff topological vector 
space Vi for each i E I, where I is any (possibly countable or uncountable) index set, and 
Ai : X --~ 2 X~ is a set-vMued mapping for each i E I. We shall denote by Ms(X,X~)ieI 
(respectively, Ls(X, Xi)i~i) the set of all families of {Ai}i~z such that for each i E I, A~ : X --* X~ 
is L-majorized (respectively, is of class L). Moreover, if the index set I is a singleton, the 
mapping A in Ms(X, X) (respectively, A in L(X, X)) is said to be L-majorized (respectively, of
class L) from X to Y. 
Throughout this paper, all topological spaces are assumed to be Hausdorff and all notions are 
the same as those used in [2] unless otherwise specified. 
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2. THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA 
FOR QUALITATIVE GAMES 
We first recall the following result which is a special case of Lemma 2.1 of [2]. 
LEMMA 2.1. Let X be a regular topological space and Y be a nonempty subset of a vector 
space E. Let 0 : X --~ E and P : X --* 2 ~" be Lo,c-majorized. I f  the support set B of the 
mapping P is open and paracompact, then there exists an Lo,c-class mapping 0 : X -~ 2 Y such 
that P(x)  C ¢(x) for each x E X.  
In order to establish the existence of maximal elements for the family of L-majorized mappings 
in which domains are not compact, we now recall the following notions. 
Let X = I I ie iXi  be a product space, where Xi is a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff 
topological vector space for each i E I and A~ : X --~ 2 x~ is a set-valued mapping. Then {A.~}.iEI 
is said to be a KF family if the following assumptions are satisfied: 
(i) for each i E I ,  Ai(x) is convex (may be empty) for each x E X; 
(ii) for each x E X, there exists i E I such that Ai(x) 7 ~ ~; and 
(iii) for each i E I, the set A~l(yi)  is compactly open in X for each y~ E X~. 
We shall denote by KF(X,  X i ) iet  the set of all KF families. For each i c I, if x~ ~ A,(x) for 
all x E X, then the family {Ai}~ei E Ms(X ,  X,i)iEI. If the case I is a singleton, the mapping 
A E KF(X,  X) is also called a KF mapping. 
THEOREM 2.2. Let X = 1] iE iX  i be a product space, where each i E I, X i  is nonempty compact 
convex subset of a topological vector space. Suppose that the family {Ai}~e/ E Ms(X ,  Xi)i~-r is 
such thatUiE~{X E X:  Ai(x) ¢ 0} = UieI int{x E X :  d~(x) # 0}. Then there exists 5" c X .such 
that Ai(:?) = 0 for each i E I. 
PROOF. It is a special case of Theorem 3.3 of [2]. I 
LEMMA 2.3. Let X be a compact Hausdorff topological space and {AZ}/EI E KF(X,X, ) iE I .  
Then there is a subset D = II i~iDi of X such that for each x C X,  there exists i ~ I such that 
A~(x) N D~ 7 ~ O. Moreover, for each i E I, Di is a polytope and all of those polytope, except a 
finite number, consist of a single point. 
PROOF. By following Deguire and Lassonde [17], for each x E X, there exists i E I such that 
A~(x) ~ 0, so that X = U~EI Oy~ex~ A-(i(Yi) • Since X is compact, there exists a finite subset J
of I such that for each j of J ,  there exists a finite subset Ja = {Y~, ' "  mj , yj } of Xj  with  X = 
0 UjEj  [-Ji'~- ~1 A; ' (y~).  Take any fixed yO = {Yi }ie, E X and define 
co ( J j ) ,  
Dy= {y0}, 
Then D = 1-l~clDi is the required set. 
i f jE  J, 
i f j~ J .  
Now we have the following existence theorem of maximal elements for a family with noncompact 
domains. 
THEOREM 2.4. Let X = IIi~xXi be a product space and I any index set, where X~ is a nonempty 
convex subset of a topologicM vector space for each i E I and {A~}iEI E Ls (X ,  X~),/EI. Suppose 
there exist a nonempty compact subset K (not necessarily convex) of X and a nonempty compact 
convex subset Ci of Xi  for each i E I with the property that for each x E X \ K,  there exists 
i E I such that Ai(x) A Ci 7 L O. Then there exists x E K such that Ai(x) = 0 for ali i ~ I. 
PROOF. By following Yuan [1], suppose it is not true. Then for each x ~ K, there exists f c I 
such that A~(x) 7 ! O. By Lemma 2.3, there exists a subset D = rIiErDi such that for each 
x E K, there exists i E I such that Ai(x) n D~ ¢ 0, where Di is a nonempty polytope (thus, it is 
nonempty compact and convex) for each i E I. 
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It is clear that D is a nonempty compact subset of X. For each i E I ,  we set Hi = co(Ci tA Di), 
then Hi is a nonempty compact and convex subset of Xi. If x E X \ K,  then there exists i E I 
such that 0 # Adx ) N Ci c Ai(x) N Hi by our hypothesis above. If x E K, by our argument 
above, there exists i E I such that 0 # Ai(x) A Di C Ai(x) N Hi. Now for each i E I ,  define a 
set-valued mapping A~ : X --* 2 H' by A~(x) = Ai(x) n Hi for each x E X. Thus, in any case, for 
each x E X, there exists i E I such that 
Ai(x) (7 Hi # ~. (*) 
Now set H := Hie iHi  and Xi := Hi for each i E I in Theorem 2.2. Then the family {A~}iel 
satisfies all hypotheses of Theorem 2.2. By Theorem 2.2, there exists x0 E H such that A~(xo) = 
for all i E I ,  which contradicts (*). Therefore, there must exist x E K such that Ai(x) = 0 for 
all i E I and we complete the proof. | 
Now as applications of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.4, we have the following existence theo- 
rem of maximal elements for L-majorized family in topological vector spaces under noncompact 
setting. 
THEOREM 2.5. Let X = HiExXi be a product space and I any index set, where Xi is a nonempty 
convex subset of a topological vector space for each i E I. Suppose that the family {Ai}i~i E 
Ms(X ,  Xi) icI  is such that the set {x E X : Ai(x) # ~} is open and paracompact for each 
i E I. Moreover, there exists a nonempty compact subset I4 (not necessarily convex) of X and 
a nonempty compact convex subset Ci of Xi for each i E I with the property that for each 
x E X \ K,  there exists j E I (not necessarily for all j E I) such that Aj (x) M Cj # O. Then there 
exists x E K such that Ai(x) = ~ for all i E I. 
PROOF. For each i E I ,  by the assumption of Theorem 2.5, it follows that by Theorem 2.1, there 
exists a set-valued mapping Bi : X --* 2 Y~ , which is of class L such that Ai(x) C Bi(x) for each 
x E X. Hence, the family {Bi}i~x satisfies all hypotheses of Theorem 2.4. By Theorem 2.4, 
there exists x E X such that Bi(x) = 0 for each i E I ,  so that Ai(x) = ~ for each i E I as 
Ai(x) C Bi(x). | 
3. THE EX ISTENCE OF  EQUIL IBR IA  
In this section, we shall study general existence of equilibria for noncompact generalized games 
with noncompact hypothesis which is weaker than those noncompact condition in existing litera- 
tures. In order to do so, we first state the following notion for so-called Noncornpact  Cond i t ion  
(wc). 
Let X = Hi~l Xi be a product space and I any possibly countable oi" uncountable set, where Xi 
is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space for each i E I. Suppose that {Ai}i~1 
is a family of mappings uch that for each i E I, Ai is a set-valued correspondence from X to Xi. 
Then the family {Ai }ic i is said to satisfies the condition (WC) if there exist a nonempty compact 
subset K (not necessarily convex) of X and a nonempty compact convex subset Ci of Xi  for each 
i E I with the property that for each x E X \ K, there exists j E I (not necessarily for all index 
j E I) such that Aj (x) N Cj # O. 
It is clear that above weaker noncompact (WC) condition is much weaker than corresponding 
noncompact conditions for generalized games used by Ding and Tan [13], Tan and Yuan [18], 
Tarafdar [19], Yuan and Tan [2], and related references therein. We also recall that a topological 
space X is said to be a perfectly normal space if X is a normal space and every closed subset 
of X is a G~-set (recall that a C~-set is countable intersections of open sets) (e.g., see [20, p. 45]. 
Clearly, a normal space X is perfectly normal if and only if every open subset of X is an F~-set. 
THEOREM 3.1. Let ~ = (Xi;Ai, Bi;Pi)i~x be a generalized game such that X = Hi~lXi is 
perfectly normal and paracompact. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied for each 
iE I :  
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(a) X~ is a nonempty convex subset of a loeally convex topological vector space E~; 
(b) Ai : X ~ 2 x~ is lower semicontinuous such that for each x • X,  A~(x) is nonempty and 
coA (x) c 
(c) the mapping Ai N Pi is L-majorized; 
(d) the set E ~ = {x • X : (A~ ~Pi)(x)  ~ O} is open in X; 
(e) the mapping family {A~ M P~}i~x satisfies the weaker noncompaet condition (~VC). 
Then G has an equilibrium point in K, i.e., there exists a point :~ = (:ci)ieI E I( such that for 
each i E I, Yci C B--7(~) and A~(~) n Pi(k) = O. 
PROOF. We first prove that for given any V = H~ciV, where for each i c I, Vi is an open 
convex neighborhood of zero in Ei, then the generalized game Fv = (X,; Ai, Bv,;Pi),er has an 
equilibrium point in K; i.e., there exists a point xv = (xv,)i~i E K such that xy, E By, (xv) and 
Ai(xv)  N Pi(xv) = 0, where Bv~(x) = (Bi(x) + Vi) A Xi for each x • X and each i • I. 
Let V = H,eiVi be given where for each i • I, Vi is an open convex neighborhood of zero 
in E~. Fix any i • I and define Av~,Bv~ : X ~ 2 x* by Ave(x) = (coA~(x) +~)NX~ and 
Bv~(x) = (Bi(x)+V~)NXi for each x • X. By (b), Ai is lower semicontinuous sothat coAi is also 
lower semicontinuous by Proposition 2.6 of [21, p. 366]. It follows from Lemma 4.1 of [5, p. 244] 
or from [3, p. 7] that Av~ has an open graph in X × X. Now let Fv~ = {x • X : x,, ~ Bw,(x)}. 
Then Fv, is open in X. Define a set-valued mapping Qv, : X + 2 ¥* by 
n if x Fv , 
Qv,(x) =- Ai(z'), i fx  • Fv,. 
By following exactly the same idea used in the proof of Theorem 3.3 of [2], we can show that the 
qualitative game 7- = (Xi, Qv~)ieI satisfies all conditions of Theorem 2.5. By Theorem 2.5, there 
exists a point xv  = (xv,)~el • K such that Qv,(xv) = 0 for all i E I. Since for each i ~ [, A,(x) 
is nonempty, we must have xv, • Bv~(xv) and Ai(xv)  A P~(xv) = O. 
Second, for each i • I ,  let B~ be the collection of all open convex neighborhoods of zero in E, 
and/3 = I l iciBi. Given any V • B, let V = I l j6IV j, where ~/~ • Bj for each j • I. By the result 
we just proved above, there exists a 2v • K such that kv~ E Bv,(2v) and Ai(2v) n Pi('2v) = 0 
for each i • I ,  where Bv,(x) = (B i (x )+Vi )nX~ for each x • X. It follows that the set 
Qv := {x •: x, • Bv~(x) and A~(x) n P~(x) = 0} is a nonempty closed subset of K by (d). Now 
we want to prove that the family {Qv}ve~ has the finite intersection property. Let {Vt , . . . ,  
I~} be any finite subset of/3. For each i = 1,. . .  ,n, let Vi = IIj~IV~j, where ~ j  • /3~ for each 
j • I; let V = Hjel(Nin=l VO), then Qv ¢ O. Clearly, Qv c Nin=l Qv~ so that (']~=~ Qv, :¢ O. 
Therefore, the family {Qv : V • 13} has the finite intersection property. Since K is compact, 
Nve~ Qv ¢ O. Now take any ~ • ~v~t~ Qv, then for each i • I, ki • Bv~ (~) for__each V~ ,~ B,,: 
and Ai(~) 71Pi(ah) = 0. By Lemma 5.3 of [18], it follows that tbr each i • I, 'xi ~ Bi(~:). I 
As a special case of Theorem 3.1, we have the following corollary. 
COROLLARY 3.2. Let ~ = (Xi, Ai, Bi, Pi)i~I be a generalized game, where the set I of players 
is countable. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied for each i • I: 
(a) the strategic set Xi is a nonempty metrizable convex subset of a locally convex topological 
vector space; 
(b) the mapping Ai is lower semicontinuous and for each x • X,  Ai(x) is nonempty and 
coAi(z) C Bi(z); 
(c) the mapping Ai A Pi is L-majorized; 
(d) the set E ~ = {x • X : A, N P~(x) ¢ 0} is open in X; 
(e) the mapping family {Ai ~ Pi}~eI satisfies the weaker noncompact condition (we) .  
Then ~ has an equilibrium point in X.  
In what follows, we shall establish the existence of equilibria for noncompact generalized games 
in which preference mappings are not necessarily lower semicontinuous and constraint mappings 
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are only upper semicontinuous nder the weaker noncompact condition (WC). Now we have the 
following second main result in this paper. 
THEOREM 3.3. Let F = (X~; Fi; Pi)ieI be a generalized game such that X is perfectly normal 
and paracompact and each Xi has the property (K) (i.e., the convex hull of each subset in Xi is 
relative compact in Ei). Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied for each i E I: 
(i) the strategic set Xi is a nonempty closed convex set in a Hausdorff locally convex topo- 
logical vector space; 
(ii) the constraint mapping Fi is compact and upper semicontinuous with nonempty closed 
convex values; 
(iii) the mapping Fi M P~ : X --~ 2 s~ is L-majorized; 
(iv) the set Ei = {x E X : Fi(x) A Pi(x) 7 £0} is open in X.  
(v) the mapping family { Fi • Pi }icx satisfies the weaker noneompact condition (WC). 
Then F has an equilibrium ~ in K, i.e., there exists ~ c K such that :~ E Fi(:~) and Fi(:~) A Pi(:c) 
= fl for all i C I. 
PROOF. By Lemma 2.4 of [2, p. 640] (see also [4]), there is a common filtering set J such that 
for every i E I, there exists a family (Fij)jEJ of regular correspondences between X and Xi, 
such that both (Fij)jEJ and (Fij)jEj are upper approximating families for Fi. Note that Ei is 
paracompact and F /n  Pi is L-majorized on Ei from Ei to Xi. As X is perfectly normal and 
paracompact, it follows that the set Ei is also paracompact. By Lemma 2.1, it follows that there 
exists an L-class mapping ¢i : Ei --~ 2 x~ such that 
(a) (Fi N Pi)(x) C ¢i(x) and xi ~ co¢i(x) for all x e X; and 
(b) ¢~-l(y) is compactly open in X for each y E Xi. 
For each j c J, define a set-valued mapping ¢ i j :  X ~ 2 x~ by ¢ij(x) = Fij(x) N ¢i(x) for each 
x E X. Note that Fij is regular, it follows that Fij has an open graph and thus, the mapping ¢ij is 
of class L. Second, for each i E I, the set {x E X :  F~j(x)M¢ij(x) ¢ 0} = Uyex~ Fi~I(Y)N¢-[I(Y), 
which is open in X. Therefore, the game Fj = (Xi; Fij, Fij, ¢ij)ieI satisfies all hypotheses of 
Theorem 3.1 above. By Theorem 3.1, it follows that the Fj has an equilibrium a?J E K such 
that Fij(Yfl) N ¢i(~J) = 0, and 7ri(a?J) E Fij(3:J) for all i c I. Since Fi(~ j) C Fij(~:J), it follows 
that Fi(]: j) M ¢i(~J) = ft. Therefore, {xJ}jEj C E c,, where the set E~ = {x e X : x ~ Ei} is 
closed in X by Condition (iv). On the other hand, note that (:~J)jEJ is a net in the compact 
set K, without loss of generality, we may assume that (~2J)jEj converges to x* C K. Then for 
each i ~ I, x~ = l imjej ~{. As x* E E~ for all i ~ I, it follows that Fi(x*) A Pi(x*) = 0. Since 
~J is an equilibrium point of FA and Fi---~ is regular, for each x ~ X, clFij(x) = F~j(x), therefore, 
(~)  e cl(Bi3(r?J)) = Fij(YcJ). As Fij has a closed graph, it follows that (x*,x~) e GraphF-~ij for 
every i E I. For each i ~ I, since cl(Fij)j~j is an upper approximation family for Fi, it follows 
that NjeJFij(x ) C Fi(x) for each x ~ X so that (x*,x*) ~ Graph~.  Therefore, for each i ~ I, 
F~(z*) N P~(x*) = 0 and 7c~(x*) E ~(x*)  and this completes the proof. | 
Note that each metrizable space is perfectly normal and paracompact by Theorem 4.1.13 of 
[20, p. 254], and as an application of Theorem 3.3, we have the following. 
COROLLARY 3.4. Let F = (X~; Fi; P~)~e~ be a generalized game such that X is metrizable and 
each Xi has the property (K), where I is countable. Suppose that the following conditions are 
satisfied for each i ~ I: 
(i) the strategic set Xi is a nonempty closed convex set (indeed, it is metrizable) in a Hausdorff 
locM1y convex topological vector space; 
(ii) the constraint mapping Fi is compact and upper semicontinuous with nonempty closed 
and convex values; 
(iii) the mapping Fi A Pi is L-majorized; 
(iv) the set E~ = {x ~ X :  Fi(x) (3 Pi(x) ¢ O} is open in X; 
(v) the mapping family {F~ N P,}ie~ satisfies the weaker noncompact condition (WC). 
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'/'hen F has an equilibrium c? in K such that c?i E Fi(:?) and Fi(d:) N Pi(Yc) = 0 for all i c I. 
REMARK 3.5. The Example A of [2] shows that the conclusions of Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 
do not hold if we withdraw the hypothesis '(iv) for each i E I, the set E i = {x E X : (A~ C~ Pi)(x) 
# 0} is open in X'; 
REMARK 3.6. We first note that Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 show that Theorems 3.4 and 3.8 of [2] 
hold without the hypothesis of lower semicontinuity for the preference mappings under our non- 
compact condition (WC) which is weaker than ninny those noncompact conditions used in the 
existing literature. Second, our Corollary 3.4 also shows Corollary 1 of [22] still holds when the 
set of players (respectively, agents) is uncountable instead of countable and the strategic (respec- 
tively, commodity) spaces may not be compact. Thus, our results in this paper include many 
corresponding existence of equilibria for (even noncompact) generalized games (respectively, ab- 
stract economics) in existing literatures as special cases. Finally, we should point out that in 
order to establish our general theory for the existence of equilibria, we need the hypothesis so- 
called 'perfectly normal' (of course this hypothesis is automatically satisfied when tile space X is 
metrizable), but we do not know whether the conclusions of both Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.3 
still hold without the hypothesis of 'perfectly normal paracompactness' on the set X. 
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